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Evidence of the Absence of Fresh Complaint Is 
Admissible in Sodomy Prosecution-
United States v. Goodman* 
[Vol. 6!1 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of sodomy by a general 
court martial.1 The alleged victims of the defendant had failed to 
complain immediately following the incidents, and evidence of 
such failure on the part of one of the witnesses had been admitted 
at trial. A Navy board of review affirmed the conviction, modifying 
the sentence.2 Defendant appealed to the United States Court of 
Military Appeals on the ground that it had been prejudicial error 
for the law officer to refuse to give a proffered instruction to the 
court-martial panel respecting the victim's failure to make fresh 
complaints. On appeal, held, reversed, one judge dissenting.3 Evi-
dence of the absence of fresh complaint is admissible in a sodomy 
proceeding, and it is prejudicial error to refuse to give instructions 
concerning such absenc·e. 
Although the issue in the principal case was whether instruc-
tions should have been given concerning the effect of the absence 
of fresh complaint,4 it is necessary first to consider the admissibility 
of such evidence because the law developed in this area. The rules 
governing admissibility of evidence establishing fresh complaint 
were developed by the courts in rape cases. Until the nineteenth 
century, evidence of fresh complaint in prosecutions for rape was 
admitted by the courts with little or no attempt to explain the 
principles which supported admission.5 In the early nineteenth 
century, however, courts began to search for principles to justify 
the admission of these statements and particularly to reconcile th~ir 
admission with the hearsay rule, 6 which in general denies admission 
of consistent out-of-court statements to corroborate a witness' testi-
mony.7 Three theories of admissibility were developed. The first 
• 13 U.S.C.M.A. 663 (1963). 
I. Defendant was convicted for performing acts of fellatio upon the victims under 
Article 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1958). 
2. The sentence of dishonorable discharge was reduced to a bad conduct discharge. 
Principal case at 664. 
3. Chief Judge Quinn dissented on the ground that the matter of the absence of 
fresh complaint should be left solely to counsel's arguments and should not be isolated 
by the law officer for the court's consideration. Principal case at 670. 
4. The court's dictum respecting admissibility of fresh complaint appears to have 
been based on the UNITED STATES MANUAL FOR CoURT MARTIAL 1J 142c (1951), providing 
for the admission of evidence establishing a fresh complaint in prosecutions for sexual 
offenses. See principal case at 666. 
5. See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1134 (3d ed. 1940). 
6. Ibid. 
7. See, e.g., Dier v. Dier, 141 Neb. 685, 4 N.W.2d 731 (1942); Grand Forks Bldg. &: 
Dev. Co. v. Implement Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.D. 618, 31 N.W.2d 495 (1948). 
If the complaint itself is not admitted, evidence of a fresh complaint is not, of course, 
hearsay at all; the problem is merely one of materiality and relevancy, 
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theory requires the complaint or statement to be a so-called res 
gestae declaration,8 an exception to the hearsay rule which permits 
the introduction of certain declarations made spontaneously with 
the act in question. However, the strict requirement that the com-
plaint have been immediately after the act and while the victim 
was still under the excitement of the outrage9 has prevented fre-
quent use of this theory.10 The second theory permits the admission 
of evidence of fresh complaint for the corroboration or substantia-
tion of the prosecutrix after she has testified and has been im-
peached.11 The courts differ, however, as to what type of an impeach-
ment is necessary in order to admit this evidence. Some jurisdictions 
require that impeachment have been by prior inconsistent be-
havior, 12 others require it to have been by general bad character,13 
and still others require it merely to have been by cross-examination 
of the witness.14 The final theory of admissibility permits the intro-
duction of evidence of fresh complaint to deter the jury from 
inferring consent to the offense by the victim when the evidence 
does not otherwise indicate that a fresh complaint was made.15 This 
theory follows the seemingly irregular procedure of admitting evi-
dence to negate other evidence that has not been formally intro-
duced on the assumption that the natural tendency of the jury is 
to infer that a noncomplaining prosecutrix consented to the crime.16 
For example, fresh complaint would be admissible in a rape case 
under this theory to refute the inference, permissible under a record 
silent as to the victim's complaint,17 that the victim consented to 
the offense. 
The question of the admissibility of evidence of fresh complaint 
in prosecutions for sexual offenses other than rape has produced 
much discord among the writers and the courts.18 An analysis of 
8. See, e.g., Luke v. State, 184 Ga. 551, 192 S.E. 37 (1937); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 
235 Ky. 19, 29 S.W.2d 597 (1930); Terrill v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. 584, 112 S.W.2d 734 
(1937); State v. Linton, 36 Wash. 2d 67, 216 P.2d 761 (1950). 
9. See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 49 (1954). 
10. 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1140. 
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ellis, 319 Mass. 627, 67 N.E.2d 234 (1946); State v. 
Fleming, 354 Mo. 31, 188 S.W.2d 12 (1945); State v. Saccone, 7 N.J. Super. 263, 72 
A.2d 923 (1950); State v. Werner, 16 N.D. 83, 112 N.W. 60 (1907). 
12. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 38 Ind. 39 (1871). 
13. See, e.g., Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624 (1855). 
14. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 125 N.C. 606, 34 S.E. 105 (1899). 
15. See, e.g., People v. Luce, 210 Mich. 621, 178 N.W. 54 (1920); Baccio v. People, 
41 N.Y. 265 (1869); Harmon v. Territory, 5 Okla. 368, 49 Pac. 55 (1897); Rogers v. 
State, 124 Tex. Crim. 430, 63 S.W.2d 384 (1933); State v. Willett, 78 Vt. 157, 62 Atl. 48 
(1905); State v. Mau, 41 Wyo. 365, 285 Pac. 992 (1930). 
16. 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1135. 
17. Professor McCormick has characterized this theory as a modern sophistication 
designed to reconcile the ancient admissibility of evidence of fresh complaint with the 
modern ban upon hearsay. McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 9, § 49. See generally 
Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REV. l (1937). 
18. Compare People v. Romano, 306 Ill. 502, 138 N.E. 169 (1923) and Purifoy v. 
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the theories supporting admission of evidence· of fresh complaint 
indicates the nature of the offense is irrelevant under either the 
res gestae or corroboration of complaining witness theories because 
these theories rely on generally applicable rules of evidence.19 How-
ever, under the third theory, which allows evidence of fresh com-
plaint to refute an inference of consent, such evidence should be 
admissible only in proceedings involving sexual offenses to which 
consent is a defense.20 Evidence of fresh complaint, therefore, would 
be immaterial and should not be permitted under this theory in 
sodomy cases because consent is not a defense to the crime of 
sodomy.21 Furthermore, justifying admission of fresh complaint 
under this theory on the ground that it will support the unim-
peached victim's general credibility violates the rule prohibiting 
support of credibility until it has been disputed.22 
Even though evidence of fresh complaint is determined to be 
admissible, as in the principal case, it does not follow that evidence 
of the failure to complain is also properly admissible.28 For example, 
if the evidence of a fresh complaint were admitted under the res 
gestae exception to the hearsay rule, the failure to complain would 
clearly not be admissible as a res gestae declaration.24 In addition, 
the failure to complain should not be admissible to impeach the 
victim of a crime to which consent is not a defense. If the alleged 
victim of a sexual crime were asked whether he consented to the 
crime and, upon his denial, if he were confronted with his failure 
to make an immediate complaint, the witness would have been 
improperly impeached on a collateral fact25 in a proceeding in which 
consent plays no part. 
The principal case seems to have analyzed the issue in terms of 
State, 163 Tex. Crim. 488, 293 s.w .2d 663 (1956) and l WHAllTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 
§ 437 (11th ed. 1935) and 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 11!15, with Coplin v. 
People, 67 Colo. 17, 185 Pac. 254 (1919) and State v. Sebastian, 81 Conn. 1, 69 Atl. 
1054 (1908) and 3 UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 602 (5th ed. 1957). 
19. McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 49, Zl4. 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Mantooth, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 19 C.M.R. 377 (1955); 
Purifoy v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 488, 293 S.W .2d 663 (1956); Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 
192 Va. 804, 66 S.E.2d 854 (1951). 
21. See generally James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L REv. 
689 (1941); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VANO. L. 
REv. 385 (1952). 
22. See, e.g., Mellon v. United States, 170 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1948); State v. Harmon, 
278 S.W. 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925); Newton v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 400, 180 S.W .2d 
946 (1944). 
23. But see principal case at 667. 
24. In fact, consideration of the res gestae exception is largely academic, inasmuch 
as the failure to complain, not being a statement, may fall outside normal hearsay 
categories. The question of admissibility, then, would tum upon relevancy and 
materiality. 
25. See, e.g., Consolidated Beef &: Provision Co. v. Witt &: Co., 184 Md. 105, 40 A.2d 
295 (1944); Klein v. Keresey, 307 Mass. 51, 29 N.E.2d 703 (1940). 
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the expected reaction of a victim of the crime of sodomy, concluding 
that the victim's failure to complain was admissible to contradict 
his testimony. In reaching this result, the court analogized the ex-
pected reaction of a victim of sodomy to that of a victim of rape, 
stating that a nonconsenting male victim of the crime of sodomy 
would certainly be expected to make a fresh complaint.26 There is 
merit in the court's analysis of admissibility in terms of an attack 
on the general credibility of the prosecution witness through 
actions on his part arguably inconsistent with his testimony as to 
the occurrence of the alleged criminal act.27 Nonetheless, the rele-
vance of the absence of fresh complaint as used by the defense to 
impeach the complaining witness is uncertain. Therefore, while the 
court wisely decided to uphold the law officer's admission of the 
evidence showing lack of fresh complaint, it may have erred in over-
turning the officer's determination not to give an instruction which 
would have isolated the effect of that evidence for the court-martial 
panel's consideration.28 Even in the paternalistic setting of a court-
martial,20 the solution of a problem so intimately connected with 
a close question of relevancy should be left, in the absence of a 
clear-cut abuse of discretion, to the person conducting the trial. 
26. Principal case at 667. 
27. See WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1135, at 219. 
28. Moreover, if the evidence of the victim's failure to make fresh complaint 
properly went only to his general credibility, the law officer giving the requested 
instruction would probably have had to specify this point. Perhaps, without such an 
instruction, some members of the court-martial panel may have assumed that the 
evidence of the failure to complain could properly go to the occurrence of the alleged 
criminal act itself, a circumstance favoring defendant. 
29. See 65 MICH. L. REv. 168 (1964)-
